Judiciário e política regulatória: um estudo de caso sobre o papel das cortes e dos juízes na regulação do setor de telecomunicações

AUTOR(ES)

Alvaro Pereira Sampaio Costa Júnior

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2007

RESUMO

Courts and judges have acted as negative or positive implementers of public policies, justifying the consolidation of an agenda of research around Judiciary. Based on the theoretical presupposition of the neo-institutionalist approach that the regulatory results depend on the institutional endowment of countries, including justice system institutions, this dissertation, as a case study, analyzes the impact of the intervention of Judiciary in the regulatory policies of Brazilian telecommunication sector. It adopts as methodological strategy the construction of a heuristic model directed to capture the transaction costs involved in the process of judicial revision of regulatory options. The results obtained indicate that, in the episode of discussion on tariff increase in 2003/2004, a group of institutions guaranteed a bigger degree of centralization in the decision-making process and control of lower courts by higher courts, despite the diagnosis about the performance of Brazilian judicial system centered in the hypothesis of jurisdictional uncertainty and in the dispersion of power sources. The balance, with a low incidence of transaction costs, resulted from the combination, on the one hand, of the role of institutions underlying the decision-making process and of the regulatory landmark of telecommunication sector and, on the other hand, from a behavior of the judges in the higher level of Federal Judiciary as for (i) the predominance of mandatory fulfillment rules of regulatory contracts; (ii) the consideration of causality relation between legal uncertainty and negative macroeconomic impacts in the investment environment of telecommunication sector; (iii) the legitimation of regulating agencies performance; (iv) the minimum intervention of judiciary in regulatory policy. This research points to be basic the continual effort to identify preferences of superior courts related to regulation, considering that the institutional engineering accomplished by judicial reform, still in progress, goes on inclining the balance of power in favor of the highest hierarchy of judiciary structure.

ASSUNTO(S)

judicialização pontos institucionais de veto judicial reform judiciário jurisdictional uncertainty telecommunication judicialization judiciary public policies regulação veto players custos de transação atores com poder de veto transaction costs incerteza jurisdicional regulation telecomunicações políticas públicas matriz institucional ciencia politica institutional veto points reforma do judiciário institutional matrix

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