EVIDENCE OF MORAL HAZARD IN IMF LOANS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINEAN CRISIS / EVIDÊNCIA DE MORAL HAZARD NOS EMPRÉSTIMOS DO FMI: O CASO DA CRISE DA ARGENTINA
AUTOR(ES)
MARCELO GASPARI CIRNE DE TOLEDO
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2003
RESUMO
The hypothesis that there exists a significant problem of moral hazard induced by the IMF in the international loan market is an essential ingredient of the diagnosis of the deficiencies of the international financial system. The same applies to the current proposals to restructure the system. The literature presents ambiguous support to this thesis and the results are, in our view, not definitive. We apply the methodology developed by Dell´Ariccia et al. (2002) to the Argentinean crisis in 2001 and carry out two other tests of the referred hypothesis. We also investigate its theoretical implications, extending Spiegel`s (2000) model to interpret the problem of moral hazard in the international loan market. The results of this study provide additional evidence against the moral hazard hypothesis. There is, although, a caveat that we share with the rest of the literature that regards an identification hypothesis. We argue that it is not so important for the results presented in this study.
ASSUNTO(S)
crises financeiras divida soberana financial crises sovereign debt
