A concepção de compreensão e significação no segundo Wittgenstein
AUTOR(ES)
Karina Corrêa Lelles
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2007
RESUMO
This dissertation has as its main goal to give an account of what is the understanding of a word, more specifically, of the way words can come to acquire meaning, making possible the representation of the world and allowing communication between human beings. We have as our main theoretical basis the work of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is to be found in its use in the manifoldness of language-games of daily life. Speaking a language is itself part of an activity or of a form of life. Thus, in order to know if someone understands a language, we should adopt as our criteria the observation of its ability to use words in the manifoldness of social linguistics contexts. Wittgenstein criticizes and rejects the view of the traditional philosophy, according to which it is necessary the occurrence of some act or process so to speak within the speakers, respectively, receivers mind, for a word to have a meaning and communication between them to be possible. Our aim in this dissertation is to reflect on such opposing views on the understanding of how words can acquire meaning. In short, we come to the conclusion that both views present problematic explanations of how it occurs, but also important insights into what happens when human beings understand words.
ASSUNTO(S)
compreensão atos mentais jogos de linguagem. linguagem - filosofia linguistica understanding meaning language games wittgenstein, ludwig, 1889-1951 mental acts significado
