Solipsismo e realismo no Tractatus de Ludwig Wittgenstein: O Solipsismo, levado Ãs ultimas conseqÃÃncias, coincide com o puro realismo

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2008

RESUMO

This thesis carries out an analysis of Wittgenstein‟s approach to the problem of solipsism in his book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In fact, the entire enquiry undertaken here has as its main goal to come to grips with the apparent paradox expressed in the initial statement of the tractarian aphorism 5.64, where one reads that âsolipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism.â In order to perform this task, I initially present a general overview of the Tractatus, so that one may integrate into the argumentative strategy of the Tractatus the group of aphorisms making up the section devoted to solipsism in that book. Secondly, I take up the limits of language and world and also what Wittgenstein regards as the truth of solipsism. In doing so, emphasis is laid on the pictorial theory of the proposition and on the doctrine expounding the distinction between saying and showing, which is at the core of Wittgenstein‟s analysis of solipsism. Subsequently, I examine the tractarian notion of the subject. Of special relevance here are (1) the arguments used by Wittgenstein to deny the existence of empirical subjects capable of making representations of the world; and (2) the existence of the metaphysical subject as the world‟s limit and, therefore, as a condition of possibility for the propositions of language to acquire their meaningfulness in the linguistic projection of the world. Finally, I show how it was possible for Wittgenstein to state the apparent paradox which gave rise to this enquiry. In the case at hand, stress is laid on the fact that his statement is nothing more than a necessary consequence of the whole philosophical view contained in the Wittgenstein‟s Tractatus

ASSUNTO(S)

wittgenstein tractatus solipsismo realism realismo wittgenstein tractatus sujeito solipsism filosofia subject

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