Revisitando os fundamentos do controle de constitucionalidade : uma crítica democratizante à prática judicial brasileira

AUTOR(ES)

Marcelo Casseb Continentino

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

One of the principal contemporary discussions of constitutional law falls on the tension between Democracy and judicial review. The big question involving constitutionalists and philosophers resides in how to justify the legitimacy of the judicial review in a Democracy, ruled by the principle of self-government, if the last word on what Constitution means is attributed to Judiciary Power. Starting from the presupposition that Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitution are intrinsically linked concepts, the objective of the present dissertation is to analyze critically such notions in view of the existing relationship between Democracy and judicial review, with special attention to Brazilian praxis. From this point of view, the concept of Democracy is adopted based on JÜRGEN HABERMASs discursive theory, emphasizing the importance of active and participative citizenship to legitimize the process of creation and interpretation of laws and of the Constitution. This peculiar characteristic of democratic legislative process demands from Judiciary Power the assurance of conditions for the exercise of the autonomy of the citizens by means of judicial review. Albeit, given the current configuration of the Brazilian model of judicial review, the investigation shows that it has not been exercised legitimately as, on the one hand, the judges of Brazilian Supreme Court see themselves as the final interpreters of the Constitution and, on the other hand, the citizens are more and more distant from exercising their autonomy with regard to constitutional interpretation, due to the growing concentration of judicial review. This way, underlining the democratic nature of diffuse judicial review and the necessity of revitalizing it, the dissertation suggests as an alternative to this illegitimate practice the institutionalization of a weak-form judicial review with adoption of the notwithstanding clause, whose principal merit is to attribute to the Legislative Power the authority of giving the last word on the Constitution and to the Judiciary Power the second-last word. Finally, the text defends that this institutional mechanism makes possible the preservation of the citizenss autonomy in defining the content of constitutional rules, besides creating a legitimate relationship of complementarity between Democracy and judicial review.

ASSUNTO(S)

legitimacy democracy direito constitucional direito jurisdição - democracia judicial review

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