O problema da assimetria de informação no mercado de cursos superiores: o papel do provão. / The asymmetric information problem of the undergraduate school courses: the Brazilian national exam experience.

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2004

RESUMO

This essay presents three extensions to the model first proposed by Shapiro (1983) regarding reputation. The first extension adjusts Shapiro’s original model in order to make it more suitable in dealing with the problem of asymmetric information of search goods and credence goods. The second one allows the identification of the efficiency gains obtained after the inclusion of an additional information system, while the third extension demonstrates that additional information could generate adverse effects when the good under consideration has several attributes. These theoretical extensions are then applied to evaluate the effects of the Brazilian experience regarding the introduction of the Courses National Exam - Exame Nacional de Cursos – on Brazil’s market of undergraduate school courses. Some of the theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested, offering indications that such exam plays a relevant role while diminishing the informational problem that characterizes this market.

ASSUNTO(S)

enc ensino superior reputation fixed effect moral hazard avaliação logit ordenado ordered logit seleção adversa undergraduate assessment educação risco moral efeito-fixo reputação education asymmetric information adverse selection provão informação assimétrica enc

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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