ALLOCATION OF FIRM ENERGY RIGHTS AMONG HYDRO PLANTS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH / APLICAÇÃO DE TEORIA DOS JOGOS À REPARTIÇÃO DA ENERGIA FIRME DE UM SISTEMA HIDRELÉTRICO

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2004

RESUMO

The objective of this work is to investigate the application of different methodologies of allocation of firm energy rights among hydro plants using a gametheoretic framework. It is shown that there is not an optimal and unique approach to make this allocation but there are criteria to verify if a given approach presents any inadequate aspect. One of these criteria is the justice, or fairness. It is shown that this criterion is equivalent to the condition of the core of a cooperative game. The calculation of the firm energy will be formulated as a linear program and advantages/disadvantages of different allocation methods (marginal allocation, average production on the dry period, incremental allocation and nucleolus) will be investigated. Next, an application of the Aumann-Shapley (AS) scheme to the problem of allocation of firm energy rights will be developed. It is shown that, besides being robust and computationally efficient, this scheme provides an allocation that belongs to the core of the game and therefore meets the condition of justice. The AS scheme will be applied to the Brazilian system (composed of about 100 hydro plants) and the results obtained will be compared with the allocation schemes currently adopted in the Brazilian system.

ASSUNTO(S)

firm energy benefit allocation cost allocation reflector antennas engenharia eletrica alocacao de custos teoria marginalista otimizacao linear antenas refletoras linear optimization marginal theory electrical enginnering alocacao de beneficios energia firme

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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