Um estudo sobre a relação entre ações preferenciais e valor de mercado das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto / A study about the relation of preferred shares and market value of Brazilian companies

AUTOR(ES)
FONTE

IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

17/03/2011

RESUMO

The capital market is characterized by high concentration of power in the hands of few controlling shareholders. In Brazil, the existence of preferred shares without voting rights has motivate the emergence of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, compounded by the fact that the control can be exercised with a relatively small share of the total shares issued by companies. The concentration of ownership would allow the possibility of expropriation of minority rights. Several empirical studies have been conducted over the past year in order to evaluate the influence of the structure of ownership of shares on the market value of companies. In this context, this thesis intends to bring new contributions, with emphasis on the participation of preferred shares in the ownership structure. In this work, using a sample of public companies traded at BM&FBOVESPA, from the test mean difference, rejects the hypothesis of equal value among companies that have only voting shares in its ownership structure in relation to that have both types, and preferred. Continuing, using linear regression models, is statistically significant negative relationship between market value of companies and variable used to characterize the ownership structure, specifically the difference between the percentage of participation of minority shareholders in total PN and percentage of ownership of the controlling shareholders of preferred shares in total.

ASSUNTO(S)

valor de mercado contabilidade nacional governança corporativa conflito de agência market value corporate governance agency conflicts

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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