TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCOHERENCE OF NON-TELEOLOGICAL DEISM

AUTOR(ES)

KYRIACOU, CHRISTOS

FONTE

Manuscrito

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2022

RESUMO

Abstract I argue that one form of deism, what I shall call ‘moderate non-teleological deism’, seems prima facie incoherent (at least on the assumption of the intuitive Anselmian conception of God). I offer two arguments in support of the prima facie incoherence view: the moral irresponsibility argument and the practical irrationality argument. On the one hand, the moral responsibility argument suggests that three of the essential attributes of such a deistic God are inconsistent: omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection. This is, of course, a variation of the well-known argument from evil. On the other hand, the practical rationality argument suggests that were such a deistic God to create the universe but have no further interest, plan or goal for the universe, the very act would have committed a deistic God to practical irrationality. I argue that this result follows from a widely accepted understanding of the nature of practical rationality and agency. I briefly examine some objections to the two arguments and conclude that moderate non-teleological deism seems prima facie incoherent.

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