The federal bargain and the decision-making process in the New Republic (after 1988) / A barganha federativa e o processo decisório na Nova República

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2009

RESUMO

This thesis explores the relationship between federalism and legislative parties in the Brazilian political system. It shows how the biggest national parties demonstrate expressive regional concentration of its delegation in the Chamber of Deputies, which means that the most part of the federal representants come from a few states. In general, from three to seven state sections are enough to compose the biggest parties delegations simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Putting them together, those parties add between 75% and 91% (average 81%) of the Chamber of Deputies. PPB, PTB, PMDB, PSDB e PT are parties whose representants are highly concentrated in a few districts from South and Southeast regions, while PFL`s representation is concentrated in Northeast. As a consequence, a minority (between 25% and 30%) of the representants is capable to mobilize, through majoritys formation inside their own parties, qualified majority (60%) of the plenary assembly in the Chamber of Deputies. This majority is enough to approve any legislation. Partisan concentration in a few state sections is translated in the choice of partys leaders, since two in three of them came from partys sections in states with high concentration. The President of the Chamber of Deputies choice follows similar logic what reinforces the relationship between regional composition of big national parties and key-jobs control in the political representation system. In the same way state sections have advantages conditions of bargaining, through their parties, to indicate ministerial jobs in the Executive. From Collor (1990-1992) to Lula`s (2003-2007) government three in every four ministers who belonged to big national parties are originated from high concentration states. This disproportional distribution of jobs inside the parties allows their members from few state sections have the control of the main jobs in the decision-making process in the Legislative and Executive. Those (real) results subvert (expected) institutional rules` results that draw a federative picture that evidenced the capacity of north, northeast and middle-west states. Super representation that states from these regions have in the Chamber of Deputies (malapportionment), the conversion of territories in federal unities (which reinforce these regions presence in the Federal Legislative), Brazilian Senates extended group of powers, national parties exigency, procedures originated in 1946 and/or reinforced by later constitutions, they seem to being insufficient to change distribution of powers pattern between federative states. Key-jobs control in the decision-making process still seems to guarantee a protagonist place to state party sections who are supposed sub represented in the Brazilian political system.

ASSUNTO(S)

barganha federativa processo decisório chamber of deputies federalism political parties federalismo federal bargaining decision-making process partidos políticos câmara dos deputados

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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