RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE CAMPAIGN FINANCING: INCENTIVES TO LESS ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OR TO COVERT CONTRIBUTIONS? / RESTRIÇÕES AO FINANCIAMENTO PRIVADO DE CAMPANHAS POLÍTICAS: INCENTIVOS PARA MENOR INFLUÊNCIA DO PODER ECONÔMICO OU PARA CONTRIBUIÇÕES VELADAS?

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2005

RESUMO

Reducing the influence of economic power on the electoral process is a common concern in most democracies. In the United States, for example, the Electoral Reform Act of 1971 limits the declared donations (hard money) a candidate may receive. Still, non-regulated donations to political campaigns (soft money) have allowed campaign spending to continue to grow. Would such limits to donations do nothing but stimulate covert contributions? This paper models the incentives for campaign contributions.We show that, under legal restrictions to hard money, open contributions aspect policies, while covert contributions influence the electoral outcome. By separating objectives, more restrictions to open contributions dampen incentives to covert contributions. As such, these restrictions should reduce the economic influence on the political process.

ASSUNTO(S)

economia politica political economy financiamento de campanhas politicas campaign financing

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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