Reason and freedom in Leibniz / Razão e liberdade em Leibniz

AUTOR(ES)

Andre Chagas Ferreira de Souza

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate some aspects of the Labyrinth of Freedom, a key subject in the Philosophy of Leibniz. On one hand, Leibniz supported the maximum rationality of all events, meaning that they are all absolutely predetermined. On the other, he tried to show that rational beings are morally responsible for their actions, and that requires free will. Through an act of great intellectual effort Leibniz tried to conciliate an idea of all embracing destiny (rationally understood) and the concept of freedom. He resisted admitting a vision of the world driven either by absolute necessity or lost to pure chance. His main ally in this task was the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle gained strength from the development of the concept of infinite substances (entelechia, individual substance, monades) that was gradually forged throughout the philosophers life. A brief reconstruction of some of the main features of Leibniz´s metaphysics allows us to perceive how all creatures (especially rational ones) could be seen to be truly responsible for what they do and the choices they make in a rationally structured world.

ASSUNTO(S)

razão necessity necessidade freedom contingência reason substance substância liberdade contingency

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