PASSIONS AND EVIL IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

AUTOR(ES)

BORGES, MARIA

FONTE

Manuscrito

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

13/01/2015

RESUMO

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the text Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in the Religion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

Documentos Relacionados

• A priori principles of freedom, equality and independence in Kant’s philosophy of history
• AN INTENSIONAL VIEW OF JUDGMENT IN KANT’S KRV
• Capítulo 9. The Word ‘Democracy’ in Kant’s Political Writings
• KANT’S CONSTITUTION OF A MORAL IMAGE OF THE WORLD*
• Theme and variation: Foucault’s historical apriority as criticism of Kant’s concept of a priori