PARALOGISMI E ANTINOMIE. RIFLESSIONI KANTIANE SUI CONCETTI DI SEELE E ICH DENKE

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Trans/Form/Ação

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2014

RESUMO

This essay focuses on the presence, in the section of the Dialektikdedicated to the issue of the Seele and the psychological paralogisms, of an "antinomic" approach regarding, in particular, the debate on the simplicity of the soul. In the examination of Mendelssohn's thesis concerning the soul's incorruptibility, Kant shows that it is possible to assume, together with the "extensive" criterion, an "intensive" criterion which leads to admitting the "decomposability" of the soul and the possibility of its annihilatio per remissionem. Thus, as happens in the antinomies, we are faced with two theses on the "simplicity" of the soul which are both non-contradictory, but, at the same time, opposed to each other. These reflections, proposed in the 1787 edition of the Kritik (and which seem to refer back to and refine the considerations in the 1781 edition on the simplicity of the "thinking subject" and Ich denke), play an important role and show their full value in the context of the second mathematical antinomy.

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