OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: AGENCY PROBLEMS AND DELISTING IN BRAZIL
AUTOR(ES)
MOREIRA, KLEVERSON DÁLITON SILVA, OLIVEIRA, JULIANA RODRIGUES, PEIXOTO, FERNANDA MACIEL, PEREIRA, VINÍCIUS SILVA
FONTE
RAM, Rev. Adm. Mackenzie
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2017-08
RESUMO
ABSTRACT Purpose: This study aimed to analyze determinants related with the delisting of Brazilian companies, through the analysis of the problems of agencies coming from structures of property/control and the internationalization of organizations. Originality/value: The present work seeks to fill the existing gap of more detailed studies related to the delisting of companies in the Brazilian capital market. In addition, it presents a contribution to the literature through the analysis of the relationship between Corporate Governance, Corporate Internationalization and Deslisting from the perspective of Agency Theory. Design/methodological/approach: Four econometric models based on existing literature were elaborated and then analysis of logit regressions with panel data. For data of all organizations listed in BM&FBOVESPA in the period between 2006 and 2015, period in which it was found that 205 businesses closed down their capital. Findings: As a result, it was observed that when considering the year before the delisting, organizations which have greater concentration of property had higher probability of closing their capital, which does not occur when analyzing the control structures. As to the entrance mode into international market, it was noted that there is a negative relationship between entrance mode non-patrimonial and volunteer delisting.
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