Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

AUTOR(ES)

Svaiter, Benar Fux

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

25/11/2008

RESUMO

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions.

ASSUNTO(S)

general distribution optimal auction

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