O modelo principal-agente com risco moral sob a Ãtica da economia comportamental

AUTOR(ES)

Roberta Ribeiro Fernandes

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2009

RESUMO

The principal-multiagent model with moral hazard and loss averse agents is considered here. The optimal contract for each agent invidually is a bonus scheme, similar to the classical work of Holmstrom (1979), though it is also dependent on the agentâs degree of loss aversion for the case of the principal is able to observe the agentâs type. Subsequentilly, the team contract is studied. In this setting, the principal doesnât observe the individual production of each member of the team, he just observes the total aggregate production. The contract is again a bonus scheme, likely Holmstrom (1982), though, with the applied penalty not being a value lower than the agentâs reservation utility. Unless for the case of the heterogeneous agents and the principal wishing that all agents produced efficiently. The importance of loss aversion as an economic concept is extensivally studied, mainly due to the inexistence of an agreement in the literature in relation to its definition. Usually, the loss aversion is considered as unattached to the concept of risk aversion. Here it is thought that loss aversion is, as some works in the literature suffice, a part of the risk aversion

ASSUNTO(S)

aversÃo ao risco economia risk aversion principal-agent model aversÃo à perda modelo principal-agente moral hazard risco moral loss aversion

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