Nature and role of the schemata of pure concepts of understanding, in Critique of Pure Reason / NATUREZA E PAPEL DOS ESQUEMAS DOS CONCEITOS PUROS DO ENTENDIMENTO, NA CRÍTICA DA RAZÃO PURA

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2005

RESUMO

The aim of this masters thesis is to treat in reconstructive form the chapter of Critique of Pure Reason entitled On schematism of pure concepts of understanding. First of all, one investigates the role that the schemata have to play, and that they are responsible for the furnishing of the sensible conditions especified for each category in particular, rendering possible the aplication of the said categories to phenomena. The discussion of the role of transcendental schemata will lead to a second question, namely, which the nature of these schemata is. As a result, one obtains that the transcendental schemata have a peculiar nature, disctint from the nature that the schemata of other concepts have. The peculiar nature of these schemata consists in being pure determined intuitions. At the end of the present thesis, one treats briefly the relationship between category and schema, showing that this relationship has to be conceived fundamentally as a relationship of meaning, in which the schema furnishes a real meaning to category, making possible an empirical employment of the same category in order to attain objective knowledge. As a general evaluation of the problem of schematism, one reaches to the conclusion that the chapter of schematism corresponds in fact to a proper task, which can be examined through the most recent literature on schematism. On the other hand, not only the nature of the transcendental schemata, but as well as the kind of relationship that has to be established between category and schema, in view of the extreme difficulty of text text, are issues for which the literature has still not reached a consensus.

ASSUNTO(S)

razao pura critica da razao pura filosofia filosofia conhecimento

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