Modelo de Stackelberg na competição de empresas privadas e estatais pela expansão da oferta de energia eletrica / Stalckelberg model in the competition between state-owned and private firms for the expansion in the electric energy supply

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2004

RESUMO

The process of structural reform that has been occurring in the Brazilian electric industry since the second half of the 1990 s suffered an infiection in 2002. The programs of privatizations were interrupted, stabilizing a hybrid structure where state-owned and private firms coexist in the same market. This thesis intends to analyze the effect, in the economic efficiency of the Brazilian electricity market, of the competition between agents who act under the private logic (profit maximization) and those who are compelled by their major shareholder - the government - to have the maximization of the impacts of public policies as one of their main goals. To reach such purpose, concepts from the games theory, potential competition, contestable markets, market power and economic regulation are employed. The electricity market is seen as a Stackelberg competitive environment, with the state intervention being incorporated and considered part of the rules of the game. This market concept is compatible with the recently defined institutional mo del of the Brazilian electric sector and can contribute for the current discussion concerning its implementation

ASSUNTO(S)

teoria dos jogos game theory eletric poer production macroeconomia energia eletrica - produção macroeconomic marketing electric power energia eletrica brazil

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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