Kierkegaard entre Kant e Hegel: o sentido existencial da verdade

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

In the present thesis the Kierkegaardian statement that âtruth is subjectivityâ is shown as a consequence of Kierkegaardâs critique of objectivity as a philosophical project. In its effort for objective knowledge validation, philosophy tends to annihilate the radical difference between subject and object. For Kierkegaard, this is a fatal identification since, under the excuse of certainty warranty, speculative thought watches the very subjectivity succumb before it. Then, if the statement that truth is subjectivity appears as a reassertion of the difference between subject and object, on the other hand, Kierkegaardâs existential dialectic, in its condition of a discourse founded on this irreducible difference, shows up as a discourse of paradox that, denying the possibility of God as object of thought, assumes Him as the Wholly Other. This search had as point of departure of its itinerary the existential categories of anxiety and paradox, after which it was made clear the poles in whose interior Kierkegaardian discourse moves itself: from the elaboration of the Socratic question for the possibility of truth to Socratesâ modern inheritors: Kant and Hegel

ASSUNTO(S)

verdade e subjetividade paradoxo truth and subjectivity anxiety filosofia fà e razÃo faith and reason moral autonomy paradox dialÃtica existencial existential dialectic autonomia da moral angÃstia

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