INVESTORS' ASYMMETRIC VIEWS AND THEIR DECISION TO ENTER BRAZIL'S WIND ENERGY SECTOR

AUTOR(ES)
FONTE

Pesqui. Oper.

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2014-08

RESUMO

Market players' investment decisions sometimes surprise analysts, especially when projects that are less feasible in financial terms enter first in the market, before more viable projects. One possible explanation is that firms have different expectations concerning the future of the market. In this article we use the Option-Games approach for asymmetric duopolies to analyze investors' decisions in the first auction for wind power in Brazil, held in 2009, in which some less viable firms pushed more viable firms out of the auction. Our analysis shows that even small differences in the investors' views can yield this unexpected result. When uncertainty is low and expectations are symmetric, the outcome is a lower energy tariff as well as a stronger wind industry in Brazil, highlighting the importance of a clear and credible long term governmental policy, not only for the wind industry, but also for any other industry in its early stages.

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