Impossibilidade da dúvida radical: uma resposta ao ceticismo no livro Da Certeza de Wittgenstein / Impossibility of radical doubt: an answer to skepticism in Wittgenstein´s On Certainty

AUTOR(ES)
FONTE

IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

09/12/2011

RESUMO

This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.

ASSUNTO(S)

certainty certeza e conhecimento ceticismo doubt knowledge skepticism wittgenstein wittgenstein dúvida

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