Firms in the security system services of private property: an evaluation of its governance structure. / Empresas de vigilância no sistema de prestação de serviços de segurança patrimonial privada: uma avaliação da estrutura de governança.

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2004

RESUMO

The main objective of this thesis was to identify how firms in the security system services for private properties, which are legally constituted, participate of the security system services, establishing mechanisms for incentive, control and training of their employees, besides searching for information to promote the quality of its services. The importance of the study is related to the need to evaluate if monitoring firms, regulated and fiscalized, can promote efficiency in the service sector. Secondary data about the sector was collected and a questionnaire, based on the theoretical fundaments of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), was applied to a random sample of companies that provide security services for private properties in the city of Sao Paulo. This information was analyzed through two multivariate methods, analysis of correspondence and of conglomerates, to obtain a profile of the private insurance in Sao Paulo, based on a group of companies with similar characteristics. The study results indicated that information asymmetry lead to the employment of filtering, identification of the quality signs of the workers and the use of incentive for monitoring and assuring adequate behavior. In general, there was a clear distinction between the companies that provided services to the public sector and those that provide services for the private sector. The former seemed to prioritize prices instead of quality of the services, while the later could charge higher prices for high quality services. Although the remuneration of the security officer seems to be higher than those in other activities, companies differ with respect to remuneration, according to the interest of the customers in paying for differentiated services. The efficiency wage idea can work in some circumstances although the function of monitoring the worker is intense. Quality promotion in this form of hybrid governance includes efforts to control the employee by the service provider, improving the service quality as it guarantees legal requisites are in the contract that confers less adaptive capacity to the contractor over the activities of the security officers. It can be concluded that a hybrid governance, contracting the security firm, com promote service quality guaranteeing that legal pre-requisites are respected in hiring, training and recycling be provided, personnel be selected and monitored and the incentives above market value be established. However, specific behavior that prevent the generalization of these results for all cases was observed, specially in case where contractors preferred lower prices to higher quality, as in public sector contractors.

ASSUNTO(S)

security firm teoria econômica empresa privada economic theory empresa de vigilância private firm analysis of correspondence análise de correspondência prestação de serviço services offer

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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