Equilibrium pricing and ordering policies in a two-echelon supply chain in the presence of strategic customers

AUTOR(ES)

SADJADI, SEYED J., NAEIJ, JAFAR, SHAVANDI, HASAN, MAKUI, AHMAD

FONTE

An. Acad. Bras. Ciênc.

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

07/06/2016

RESUMO

ABSTRACT This paper studying the impact of strategic customer behavior on decentralized supply chain gains and decisions, which includes a supplier, and a monopoly firm as a retailer who sells a single product over a finite two periods of selling season. We consider three types of customers: myopic, strategic and low-value customers. The problem is formulated as a bi-level game where at the second level (e.g. horizontal game), the retailer determines his/her equilibrium pricing strategy in a non-cooperative simultaneous general game with strategic customers who choose equilibrium purchasing strategy to maximize their expected surplus. At the first level (e.g. vertical game), the supplier competes with the retailer as leader and follower in the Stackelberg game. They set the wholesale price and initial stocking capacity to maximize their profits. Finally, a numerical study is presented to demonstrate the impacts of strategic behavior on supply chain gain and decisions; subsequently the effects of market parameters on decision variables and total profitability of supply chain's members is studied through a sensitivity analysis.

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