Eleições e Política Fiscal: o papel das transferências voluntárias intergovernamentais, da competência administrativa e do endividamento nos ciclos político-orçamentários

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

This dissertation explores two extensions to Rogoff (1990). The first, starts with an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are partisan motivated. In light of that, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem. The second extension modifies Rogoffs public good production function by allowing the government to borrow from abroad. Studying solely the symmetric game, it compares politicians choices in two situations: with and without short-term debt restrictions. Politicians behavior is still compared in light of different competence shocks and intertemporal discount factors.

ASSUNTO(S)

transferências voluntárias competência administrativa ciclos político-orçamentários economia política fiscal

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