Do voters reward politicians for education expenditures?

AUTOR(ES)
FONTE

Revista Brasileira de Economia

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2022

RESUMO

Abstract Since education is publicly provided in most countries, the political system typically determines the level of education expenditures. Thus, it is essential to understand politicians' incentives to allocate resources to education. This paper provides causal evidence that voters reward politicians for educational expenditures by estimating the impact of a change in public education spending on mayors' reelection chances. To do so, we use an exogenous source of variation in education expenditures brought about by a federal reform, FUNDEF, in Brazil. We show that increases in education expenditures caused by FUNDEF led to a significant increase in the mayors' reelection chances. One percent increase in per capita education expenditures due to FUNDEF led to a 1.45 percent increase in mayors' reelection chances.

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