Direito, conhecimento e expectativa social: retÃrica e persuasÃo como elementos para a compreensÃo do fenÃmeno jurÃdico

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

This dissertation intends to present the idea that law, as an object of knowledge, would be better comprehended once we have adopted rethoric as its philosophical background. We try to enforce that the knowledge of law is based, mainly, on a reflection about impressions and interpretations given to facts. In an environment like this, the understanding of the process of settlement of such impressions tends to become something real important and rethoric an relevant tool. The philosophical mark of this work is presented through a critical reflection of the greek tradition heritage. Having the desagreement between sophists and philosophers as it background, we try to rehabilitate the role played by rethoric in the knowledge process. Afterwards, we try to point out that, in the 20th Century, the ideas about law were influenced by the notion of method, which is still inspired by Descartes, as by the notion of racionality. The analysis of law through the luhmannian concepction of social expectation seemed to be appropriated to be used as a way to remark the inconsistencies of a rationalist perspective of law, as much as to point out the advantages of a rethorical approach. At last, it is presented the ambiguous role played by the notion of racionality in the building of our legal identity, sometimes as an instrument of liberty, others as a tool for domination. It is still alleged the democratic trace of a rethorical approach as it does not presume the existence of any final criterion to the fixation of meaning in law.

ASSUNTO(S)

racionality direito rethoric expectation and law expectativa e direito racionalidade retÃrica

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