CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS / GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA NO BRASIL E O PAPEL DOS INVESTIDORES INSTITUCIONAIS

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2004

RESUMO

The separation of ownership and control leads to information asymmetry and, consequently, to a moral hazard problem related to the perspective of expropriation of investors (outsiders or principals) by managers and controlling shareholders (insiders or agents). Based on case studies, this thesis aims at assessing Brazilian institutional investors` capability to mitigate the so called agency risk notably in related parties transactions. More specifically, it will use a qualitative analysis to investigate to which extent Pension Funds` activism has effect on companies` corporate governance rules and value.

ASSUNTO(S)

expropriacao governanca corporativa investidores institucionais institucional investors corporate governance expropriation

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