Contractual solutions to the holdup problem: a survey
AUTOR(ES)
Paulo, Cinthia Konichi
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
12/07/2011
RESUMO
In this survey, we presented the general idea and main results from what we understand that are the most important contributions to contractual solutions to the holdup problem literature. The aim of this paper is to push the previous analysis, uniform the notation and provide a snapshot on the most recent literature, as well as bring topics for future inquires on this issue.
ASSUNTO(S)
teoria de contratos problema de holdup externalidades investimentos específicos contract theory holdup problem externalities specific investments contratos investimentos externalidades (economia)
ACESSO AO ARTIGO
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8663Documentos Relacionados
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