Conhecimento perceptivo segundo Aristóteles / Perceptual knowledge according to Aristotle

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2006

RESUMO

The dissertation investigates the relation between knowledge and perception, perception and thought, to be and to perceive according to Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle with the objective to show what is perception according to the sofistic and to the platonic paradigm and, finally, what is the place of the aristotelian thesis of perception in relation to these two paradigms. As a result of the investigation, we conclude that, for Aristotle, and differently from Protagoras, the perception is not responsable for all judgments, neither is responsable to discriminate all cognitive objects. Furthermore, for Aristotle and differently from Plato, the extreme opposite is not true, i.e., that perception does not discriminate its own objects. Knowledge and perception, therefore, must not be absolutely identical or distinct, neither the being is absolutely being perceived, neither the being perceived is absolutely indeterminated. However, according to Aristotle the being is, somehow, perceived and determinated by the perceiving faculty, and, somehow, known by the intelect. In this way, the dissertation intends to clarify how perception knows the being according to Aristotle by treating a very controversial point: how perception discriminates its own objects without the thoughts intervention, if this discrimination is strictly a physiological process or is also an activity of the soul, and if it is also an activity of the soul, in which way the bodys physical alteration conjoined with a certain activity of the soul constitute perception.

ASSUNTO(S)

percepção perception alma e corpo objeto sensível conhecimento soul and body knowledge sensible object

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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