ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES / ACESSO À INFORMAÇÃO, OPINIÃO PÚBLICA E INCENTIVOS POLÍTICOS
AUTOR(ES)
DANIEL RIBEIRO DE SOUZA CARVALHO
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2004
RESUMO
A theory explaining how public opinion may impact the choice of economic policies made by incumbents is developed in this work. Mentioned impact it s shown to be influenced in important ways by the distribution of access to information about incumbent s choices in the population. Thus, the importance of that distribution for economic policies chosen by politicians in an economy is highlighted. The analysis is based on a career concern model where incumbents choose an economic policy involving conflicting interests among voters who are imperfectly informed about their decisions. Based on the obtained results, an explanation for a fact observed in many Latin American countries it s provided. In those countries, although wealthier groups of society are systematically favored by governmental spending, there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with economic policies chosen by governments. A mechanism explaining how the distribution of access to information about incumbent s choices can hinder economic growth and development in an economy is also presented. The analysis suggests that media behavior and the design of political institutions are important factors for the economic development of developing countries.
ASSUNTO(S)
acesso a informacao eleicoes public opinion elections incerteza politica access to information desenvolvimento economico political uncertainty economic development opiniao publica
