A economia política do governo Collor: discutindo a viabilidade de governos minoritários sob o presidencialismo de coalizão / Political economy of the Collor government: discussing the viability of minority governments under the presidentialism of coalition

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2008

RESUMO

This paper aims at discussing the survival of minority governments under Brazilian presidentialism, with its focus on the formation of the Collor government, when a minority cabinet was assembled. The hypothesis put forth in this study is that the president acted rationally in picking the minority option, however counter-intuitive it might seem, given that it is not supported by the traditional concept of coalition presidentialism around which most of our political literature was built. We thus need to shed light on the state-of-the-art of the Brazilian political system, which evidences some specific dynamics of Executive-Legislative relations permissible to the existence and viability of minority coalition governments. Following this notion, we built an analytical model whose variables allow us to unveil the presidential calculus that led President Collor de Mello into forming his cabinet with nonpartisan portfolio-holders. In the end, the relationship between that government and the PMDB during the voting of the Collor Plan is brought to light, in order to demonstrate that governments lacking nominal majoritarian support are able to enjoy legislative success, given a particular juncture.

ASSUNTO(S)

presidencialismo de coalizão minority government system of government (brasil) sistema de governo (brasil) collor government governo collor presidentialism of coalition governo minoritário

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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