A coalition approach to trade policymaking in the United States: the fast-track authority fiasco of 1997 and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000

AUTOR(ES)

Cezar, Rodrigo Fagundes, Carvalho, Carlos Eduardo

FONTE

Rev. bras. polít. int.

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

27/04/2017

RESUMO

Abstract This article proposes a framework centered on coalitions between the executive, the congress and interest groups for the analysis of the US trade policymaking process. Such a framework is focused on two main concepts, “willingness to bargain” and “pivotal actor”. The work advances two main hypotheses related to the ability of pro-free-trade actors to come to an agreement and anti-free-trade actors to effectively oppose trade liberalization. Two case studies are undertaken in order to check the plausibility of such hypotheses: the fast-track fiasco (1997) and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China (2000).

Documentos Relacionados

• Apresentação do fast-track da ANPAD 2009
• Manitoba to fast-track less critical emergency patients
• Fast-Track Management of Patients Undergoing Proximal Pancreatic Resection
• Fast-track evaluation of a compact chemically enhanced-trickling filter system
• Fast-track surgical referral in a population displaced by war and conflict