RACIOCÍNIO CAUSAL E INFERÊNCIA INDUTIVA NO PENSAMENTO DE DAVID HUME / CAUSAL REASONING AND INDUCTION IN DAVID HUME
AUTOR(ES)
CARLOS JACINTO NASCIMENTO MOTTA
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2004
RESUMO
The aim of this work is to present the results of my master´s degree research, which tried to show some of the characteristics of David Hume´s approach to induction. According to the standard interpretation, Hume is responsible for showing that our reason is not able to justify any of our inductive reasonings. Hume´s problem also characterizes itself by being a problem about the rationality of science, for, since his main method, induction, cannot receive a rational foundation, it seems licit to assert that the result of any inductive inference is irrational. In order to precisely describe the Humean criticism I am going to show how Hume presents his theories concerning causal reasoning in this A Treatise of Human Nature, define the exact characteristics of causal reasoning according to him, and compare this analysis to those by some of his main critics. We shall try to bring to light the proposed inadequacy of the latter. Next we will discuss some of the most celebrated interpretations of Hume´s philosophy, specially those by of Mackie, Beauchamp and Mappes. The final chapter aims at showing the rational characteristics that can be assigned to Humean causal reasoning emphasizing the particular character of his inferences. Finally, we show how the origin of the copy principle can be an instance of the use of inductive inferences by Hume, which allows us to risk some heterodox hypotheses concerning his view of rationality.
ASSUNTO(S)
racionalidade requisicao remota de metodos inducao induction causal reasoning causal inference raciocinio causal logica indutiva rationality remote method invocation david hume inductive logic inferencia causal david hume
